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TEN ARGUMENTS AGAINST HATE-SPEECH REGULATION:
HOW VALID?
by Richard Delgado' and Jean Stefancic

We'd like to thank the law school, the law review, and the sponsors of
this event for bringing us here to this beautiful region and school. It's a

pleasure to be here-even if Jean is the only woman on the program and
the two of us are the only identifiable representatives of modern leftist
thought. On a panel packed with voices from the other side of the spec-

trum, we will take our place in the lineup as a vote of extraordinary
confidence.
Beginning about twelve years ago, many American universities began
noticing an upsurge in incidents of racial violence and name calling.
These ranged from out and out violence-beatings, gay bashing, arson
against buildings housing black fraternities-to taunts, name-calling and
anonymous leaflets demanding that blacks and others "go home." A
national institute counts over 200 campuses where incidents severe
enough to make the news have occurred, and estimates that the average
black undergraduate is victimized by hate speech at least twice during

four years on campus. The increase seems to be real and not the product
of increased sensitivity or better reporting. It comes at a time when many
Western nations are reporting an upsurge of anti-Semitism, hate propa-
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ganda, and attacks on immigrants. In the U.S., the upsurge corresponds
with increased social unrest and competition over changing job markets,
exactly as social science would predict.
Can campuses do anything about this-about the invective part, at any
rate? Until fairly recently, the answer would have been no. But First
Amendment legal realism, now belatedly appearing, suggests otherwise.
First Amendment legal realism, which includes such well known legal
scholars as Mark Tushnet, Jack Balkin, and a host of Critical Race theorists, is casting aside tired maxims and ancient shibboleths such as no
content regulation, the best cure for bad speech is more speech, and so
on, and looking instead to purpose, effect, context, and class and self
interest, and turning to social science and communication theory to understand how speech really works. One realist observation, from Mark
Tushnet, holds that private action, such as hate speech and hate crime, is
today a more serious threat to liberty and well-being than the hobgoblin
of former years, the censor. Activist courts that today reach out to strike
down campus hate-speech rules enacted by communities who wish, for
educational reasons, to govern themselves that way, are an example of a
second realist insight-this one from Jack Balkin, namely ideological
drift-the notion that a principle like the First Amendment over time can
switch places so that it becomes a protector of privilege and a refuge for
scoundrels. Many in the ACLU have resisted the implications of these
two trends, although they cannot do so much longer. A number of breakaway chapters have chosen to endorse civil rights and hate-speech rules
in defiance of the national organization's policy; and of course, every
time they defend a prominent Nazi they lose a thousand members, a rate
they cannot keep up for long.
A third realist observation provides the occasion for this talk, namely
that now that various cliches and conversation-ending maxims such as nocontent discrimination are passing into history, issues of speech regulation will be decided on the basis of policy, or as a great judge once said,
experience, not logic.
Everyone-outside the conservative judiciary, at any rate-realizes
this, so that today even defenders of the current regime are beginning to
hedge their bets and argue that even if hate-speech rules are constitutional, they are a bad idea and campuses and other social institutions should
abjure them. We will discuss ten such arguments and show why they are
not valid. These arguments fall into three groups. Jean will discuss ones
associated with our liberal friends; I will take up a group associated with
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the neoconservative, sometimes called the "toughlove" school. At the end
Jean will return to discuss a final series of objections dealing with
administrability. It's worth repeating that our talk deals with arguments
against regulation, with the aim of showing they are invalid. Today, we
shall not be making an affirmative case for hate-speech rules. We've
already made that argument; it's in print; and if you are interested you
can read it. Today, we deal with objections to our position that there
should be rules against hate speech.
Now consider three paternalistic justifications for opposing hate-speech
rules:
(1) Permitting racists to utter racist insults allows them to blow off steam
harmlessly. Minorities accordingly are safer than they would be under a
regime of antiracism rules. We will refer to this as the "pressure valve"
argument.
(2) Free speech has been minorities' best friend. Persons interested in
achieving reform, such as minorities, should resist placing any fetters on
freedom of expression. This we term the "best friend" objection.
(3) More speech-talking back to the bigot-ratherthan regulation is the
solution to racist speech. Racism is a form of ignorance: dispelling it
through reasoned argument is the only way to get at its root. Talking
back to the aggressor also is empowering. It reduces victimization,
strengthens one's own identity, and reinforces pride in one's heritage.
This we call the "talk back" argument.
Each of these arguments is paternalistic, as we mentioned, invoking the
interest of the group seeking protection. Each is seriously flawed; indeed,
the situation is often the opposite of what its proponents understand it to
be. Let us examine these arguments in detail.

1. The Pressure Valve Argument
The pressure valve argument holds that rules prohibiting hate speech
are unwise because they increase minorities' jeopardy. Forcing racists to
bottle up their emotions means that they will be more likely to say or do
something hurtful later. Free speech serves as a pressure valve, allowing
tension to dissipate before it reaches a dangerous level. If minorities
understood this, the argument goes, they would reject antiracism rules.
The argument is paternalistic; it says the rules, which you think will help
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you, will only make matters worse. If minorities knew this, they would
join in opposing them.
How valid is this argument? Hate speech may well make the speaker
feel better, but it does not make the victim safer. On the contrary, psychological evidence shows that permitting one person to say or do hateful
things to another increases, rather than decreases, the chance that he or
she will do so again. Moreover, others may come to believe that they
may follow suit. We are not mechanical objects. Our behavior is more
complex than the laws of physics that describe pressure valves, tanks,
and such other mechanical things. Unlike them, we use symbols to construct our social world, a world that contains categories and expectations
for "black," "woman," "child," "teacher," "inner-city gang member,"
and so on. Once these categories are in place, they govern perception.
They also govern the way we speak and act toward members of those
groups in the future.
Even barnyard animals act on the basis of categories. Poultry farmers
know a chicken with a speck of blood may be pecked to death by the
others. With chickens, of course, the categories are neural, functioning at
a level more basic than language. But social science experiments show
that the way we categorize others radically affects our treatment of them.
A school teacher's famous "blue eyes/brown eyes" experiment showed
that even a one-day assignment of stigma can drastically alter behavior
and performance. At Stanford University, Phillip Zimbardo assigned
students to the roles of prisoner and prison guard, but was forced to
discontinue the study when some of the participants began taking their
assignment too seriously. And Diane Sculley's interviews with male
sexual offenders in her 1990 book Understanding Sexual Violence
showed that many did not see themselves as criminals at all since they
considered women fair game. At Yale University, Stanley Milgram
showed that many subjects could be induced to act in ways that violated
social norms if an authority figure ordered them to do so and assured
them it was safe.
Allowing persons to stigmatize or revile others thus makes them more
aggressive, not less so. Once the speaker comes to think of another as a
deserved-victim, his or her behavior may easily escalate to bullying and
physical violence. Stereotypical treatment also tends to generalize-what
we do teaches others that they may do so as well. Pressure valves may be
safer after letting off steam, but human beings are not.
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2. Free Speech as Minorities' Best Friend
Many liberals argue that the First Amendment historically has been a
great friend and ally of social reformers. The national president of the
ACLU, for example, argues that without free speech Martin Luther King,
Jr. could not have changed America as he did. And so for the environmental movement, women's rights, gay liberation, and so on. This argument is paternalistic, based on the supposed best interest of minorities. If
they understood this best interest, the argument goes, they would not ask
to bridle speech.
The argument oversimplifies the history of the relationship between
racial minorities and the First Amendment. In fact, minorities often have
made greatest progress when they acted in defiance of that amendment.
The original Constitution protected slavery in several provisions, while
the First Amendment existed alongside that institution for nearly 100
years. Free speech for slaves, women, and other outsiders was simply not
a significant concern for the drafters, who appear to have thought of the
First Amendment primarily as a source of protection for the kind of
refined political and artistic discourse they and their class enjoyed.
Even later, when abolitionism and civil rights activism broke out,
examination of the role of speech in reform movements shows that the
relationship of the First Amendment to social advance is not so straightforward as First Amendment absolutists maintain. In the 1960s, for example, Martin Luther King, Jr. and others did use speech to kindle
America's conscience. But as often as not, the First Amendment (as then
understood) did not protect them. They rallied, were arrested and convicted; sat in, were arrested and convicted; marched, were arrested and
convicted. Their speech was deemed too forceful, too disruptive. Many
years later their convictions might be reversed on appeal, at the cost of
thousands of dollars and a great deal of gallant lawyering. But the First
Amendment as then understood helped much less than we like to think.
Narrative theory shows how this happens: we interpret new stories in
terms of the old ones we have internalized and that form our current
reality. When new stories deviate too drastically from those that make up
our present understanding, we reject them as false and dangerous. Free
speech is useful mainly for solving small, clearly bounded disputes; it is
much less useful for redressing systemic evils, such as racism, that are
deeply inscribed in our current paradigm. Language requires a set of
shared meanings that a group agrees to attach to words and terms. If
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racism is deeply embedded in that paradigm-incorporated into a thousand scripts, stories, jokes, and roles-one cannot speak out against it
without appearing incoherent or ridiculous.
The landscape of current First Amendment exceptions betrays these
forces in operation. Our system has carved out or tolerated dozens of
"exceptions" to free speech: official secrets; libel; conspiracy; plagiarism; copyright; misleading advertising; words of threat; disrespectful
words uttered to a judge, teacher, or other authority figure; and many
others. These exceptions, enacted at the insistence of a powerful group,
seem familiar and acceptable, as indeed perhaps they are. But the idea of
a new exception to protect some of the most defenseless members of
society, young minority undergraduates at predominantly white campuses,
produces consternation: the First Amendment must be a seamless web. '
But it is we who are caught in a web-the web of the familiar. The
First Amendment seems to us commonplace, useful, and valuable. It reflects our sense of the world, allows us to make distinctions, tolerates
exceptions, and gets things done in a way we assume will be equally
valuable for others. But the history of the First Amendment, as well as
the landscape of current exceptions, shows that it is much more valuable
to the majority than to the minority, more useful for confining change
than propelling it.

3. The "More Speech" Argument
Some First Amendment purists argue that minorities should talk back
to the aggressor. For example, Nat Hentoff writes that antiracism rules
teach people of color to depend on whites for protection, while talking
back emphasizes self-reliance and strengthens one's self-image as an
active agent in charge of one's own destiny. The talk-back approach
draws force from the First Amendment principle of "more speech,"
according to which additional discussion is always a preferred response to
a message some listener finds troubling. Hentoff and others oppose hatespeech rules, then, not so much because they limit speech, but because
they believe minorities should learn to speak out. A few offer another
advantage: a minority who speaks out will be able to educate the utterer
of a racially hurtful remark. Racism is the product of ignorance and fear.
If a victim of racist hate speech explains matters, she may alter the
speaker's perception so he or she no longer will utter racist remarks.
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Like many paternalistic arguments, this one is offered virtually as an
article of faith. In the nature of paternalism, those who offer the argument are in a position of power. They believe themselves able to make
things so merely by asserting them. They rarely offer empirical proof of
their argument, because none is needed. The social world is as they say
because it is theirs: they created it that way.
Unfortunately, things are not as asserted. Those who hurl racial epithets do so because they feel empowered to do so. One who talks back is
seen as issuing a direct challenge to that power. Often racist remarks are
delivered in several-on-one situations in which responding in kind would
be foolhardy. Indeed, many cases of racial homicide began in just this
way: a group badgered a black person; the black talked back; and paid
with his life. Other racist remarks are uttered in a cowardly fashion, by
means of graffiti scrawled on a campus wall under cover of darkness, or
by a flyer placed outside a black student's door. In these situations, more
speech is simply unfeasible.
Racist vitriol is rarely a mistake that could be corrected or countered
by discussion. How could one respond to: "N
, go back to Africa.
You don't belong at the university"? Would one say: "Sir, you do not
understand. According to prevailing ethics and constitutional interpretation I, an African American, am of equal dignity and entitled to attend
this university in the same manner as others. Now that I have explained
this, will you please modify your remarks in the future?"
The notion that talking back is safe for the victim or educative for the
racist is deeply fallacious. It ignores the power dimension to racist remarks, requires minorities to run very considerable risks, and treats a
hateful message as an invitation for discussion. Even when successful,
talking back is a burden. Why should minority undergraduates, already
burdened with their own educational responsibilities, be charged with
educating others?
The three paternalistic arguments do not survive analysis. Neither
current doctrine nor liberal policies pertaining to minorities' well-being
dictate that there should not be antiracism rules. Could there be other
reasons-perhaps associated with the conservative camp? A second group
of arguments all concern the idea of victimization and tend to be associated with neoconservatives, including some of color.
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4. The Waste-of-Time Argument
Many such writers argue that mobilizing against hate speech is a waste
of precious time and resources. Donald Lively, for example, urges that
civil rights leaders should have better things to do. Concentrating on
hate-speech reform, he writes, is myopic and able, at best, to benefit only
a small number of minority persons. Instead of "picking relatively small
fights of their own convenience," reformers should be examining "the
obstacles that truly impede" racial progress, namely inadequate legal
doctrine and financial savvy. Dinesh D'Souza writes that campus radicals
champion hate-speech regulation because it is easier than working hard
and getting a first-rate education. Henry Louis Gates wonders why this
minor issue attracts the attention of so many academics when so much
more serious work remains to be done.
But is it so clear that working to control hate speech is a waste of time
and resources? What neoconservative writers may neglect is that eliminating hate speech goes hand in hand with combating what they call "real
racism." Certainly, being the victim of hate speech is a less serious misfortune than being denied a job, a mortgage, or an educational opportunity. But it is equally true that a society that speaks and thinks of minorities
disparagingly is tolerating an environment in which these more active
forms of discrimination will occur frequently. First, hate speech, acting
in concert with a panoply of media imagery, constructs and reinforces a
picture of minorities in the mind of the public. This picture or stereotype,
which varies from era to era, is rarely positive: minorities are happy and
carefree, oversexed, criminal, treacherous, untrustworthy, immoral,
stupid, and so on.
These stereotypes account for much misery in the lives of persons of
color, including motorists who fail to stop to aid a stranded black driver,
police officers who roust African-American youths innocently walking or
talking to each other on the streets, or landlords who act on unarticulated
feelings in renting an apartment to a white over an equally qualified black
or Mexican. Once persons of color are rendered one-down in the minds
of hundreds of actors, their victimization by what even the toughlove
crowd would recognize as real discrimination increases in frequency. It
also acquires the capacity to sting. A white motorist who suffers an epithet ("goddam Sunday driver!") may be momentarily stunned. But the
epithet does not call upon an entire historical legacy the way a racial
epithet does, nor deny the victim status and personhood.
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A related reason why neoconservatives ought not throw their weight
against hate-speech rules has to do with latter-day racism. Most
neoconservatives, like many whites, think that acts of out-and-out discrimination are rare. The racism that remains is subtle, "institutional,"
"latter-day," lying in the arena of unarticulated feelings, practices, and
patterns of behavior on the part of institutions and individuals. A focus
on speech and language may be one of the few ways to address and cure
this kind of racism. Thought and language are closely connected. A
speaker asked to reconsider his or her use of language may for the first
time reflect on the way he or she thinks about a subject. Our choice of
word, metaphor, or image betrays the attitude we have about a person or
subject. No better tool than a focus on language exists to deal with this
form of subtle or latter-day racism. Since neoconservatives are among the
leading proponents of the idea that this form of racism is the only one
that remains, they should think carefully before opposing measures that
might curb it. Of course, speech codes would not reach every form of
disparaging speech or depiction. But a tool's unsuitability to redress
every aspect of a problem is surely no reason to refuse to deploy it where
it is effective.
Neoconservatives similarly argue against hate-speech regulation on the
basis that the effort is quixotic or disingenuous. Lively, for example,
writes that the Supreme Court consistently has rejected laws regulating
speech on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. He also writes that the
campaign lacks a sense of "marketability"-the American people simply
will not buy it. Gates asks how hate-speech activists can believe that
campus regulations will be effective. If campuses are the seething masses
of racism activists believe, how will administrators provide fair hearings
under the codes? Elsewhere he accuses the hate-speech activists of pressing claims for "symbolic" reasons, while ignoring that the free-speech
side has a valid concern over symbolism, too.
But is the effort to curb hate speech quixotic or disingenuous? If the
gains to be reaped were potentially only slight, maybe so. But, as we
have argued, they are not: our entire structure of civil rights laws and
rules depends for its efficacy on controlling the background of pernicious
depiction against which the rules and practices operate. In a setting where
minorities are thought and spoken of respectfully, few acts of out-and-out
discrimination would occur. In one that constantly stigmatizes and demeans them, even a determined judiciary will be hard pressed to enforce
equality and racial justice.
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Furthermore, success is much more within reach than the toughlove
crowd acknowledges. A host of Western democracies have instituted laws
against hate speech and hate crime. Some, like Sweden, Great Britain,
and Canada, have traditions of respect for free inquiry rivaling ours. In
recent years, several hundred college campuses have instituted student
conduct codes penalizing face-to-face racial insults, many in order to
advance interests the campus saw as necessary to its function, including
protecting diversity or providing an environment conducive to learning.
Powerful actors like government agencies, the writers' lobby, industries,
and so on have always been successful at coining free speech "exceptions" to suit their interest-copyright, false advertising, words of threat,
defamation, libel, plagiarism, words of monopoly, and many others. But
the strength of the interest behind these exceptions seems no less than
that of a black undergraduate subjected to vicious abuse while walking
late at night on campus. New regulation is of course examined skeptically
in our laissez-faire age. But the history of free speech doctrine, and especially the careers of the many "exceptions," shows that need and policy
have a way of being converted into law. The same may well happen with
the hate-speech movement.

5. The Bellwether Argument
A further argument is that hate speech should not be driven underground but allowed to remain out in the open. The racist who one does
not know, it is argued, is more dangerous than the one who one does.
Moreover, on a college campus, incidents of racism or sexism can serve
as useful spurs for discussion and self-examination. Steve Carter writes
that regulating racist speech will leave minorities little better off than they
are now, while screening out "hard truths about the way many white people look at . . . us." D'Souza echoes this argument when he points out
that hate-speech crusaders miss a valuable opportunity. When racist graffiti or fraternity parties proliferate, minorities should reflect on the possibility this may indicate a basic problem with affirmative action itself. An
editor of Southern California Law Review considers antiracism rules
tantamount to "sweeping the problem under the rug," while "keeping the
problem in the public spotlight . . . enables members [of the university
community] to attack it when it surfaces."
How should we see this argument? In one respect, it does make a valid
point: the racist who is known, in most cases, is less dangerous than the
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one who is not. What the argument ignores is that there is a third alternative-the racist who is cured or at least deterred by official rules and
policies from exhibiting the behavior he or she once did. Since most
conservatives believe that laws and penalties do change conduct-indeed
are among the strongest proponents of heavy penalties for crime-they
ought to concede that campus guidelines against hate speech and assault
would decrease those behaviors. Of course, regulation has costs of its
own-something even we would concede-but this is a different argument
from the bellwether one.
Other neoconservatives argue that silencing the racist might deprive the
campus of the "town hall" opportunity to discuss and analyze issues of
race when racist incidents come to light. But campuses could hold those
discussions anyway. Even the best-drafted rules will not suppress hate
speech entirely; there will continue to be some incidents of racist speech
and behavior. The difference is that now there may be campus disciplinary hearings, which virtually guarantee the "town hall" discussions the
argument assumes desirable. Because the bellwether argument ignores
that rules will have at least some deterrent effect and that there are other
means of assuring campuswide discussions short of allowing racial invective to flourish, the argument deserves little weight.
6. Victimization
Another objection many neoconservatives raise is that prohibitions
against verbal abuse encourage minorities to see themselves as victims.
Instead of rushing to campus authorities every time something wounds
their feelings, minority group persons ought to learn either to speak back
or ignore the offensive behavior. A system of rules and hearings reinforces that they are weak, that their lot in life is to be victimized rather than
assertive. Carter writes that anti-hate-speech rules are the special favorite
of those "whose backgrounds of oppression make them especially sensitive to the threatening nuances that lurk behind racist sentiment." Lively
warns that these rules end up reinforcing a system of "supplication and
self-abasement," D'Souza that they prevent interracial friendships and
encourage a "crybaby" attitude; Gates that they reinforce a "therapeutic"
mentality and an excessive preoccupation with feelings.
Would hate-speech rules have these dire effects? Not at all-in part
because other alternatives will remain as before. No African American or
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gay student is required to file a complaint when targeted by verbal abuse.
He or she can always talk back or ignore it if he or she prefers. Hatespeech rules simply provide one more avenue of recourse for those who
wish to take advantage of them. Filing a complaint might even be considered one way of taking charge of one's destiny: One is active, instead of
passively "lumping it" when racial invective strikes. Notice that we do
not raise the "victimization" issue with other offenses we suffer, such as
having a car stolen or a house burglarized. Nor do we encourage those
victimized by these crimes to "rise above it" or talk back to their victimizer. Might it be because we secretly believe that a black who is called
"n__"

by a group of whites is in reality not a victim? If so, it would

make sense to encourage him not to dwell on the event. But this is different from saying that filing a complaint increases victimization. Moreover,
it is simply untrue: filing a civil rights complaint does not cause otherwise innocuous behavior to acquire the capacity to harm.
A related neoconservative argument is that hate-speech rules are injurious to other values that we hold, such as equal treatment of offenders.
The rules will end up punishing only what ignorant or blue-collar students do and say. Refined, but much more devastating expressions of
contempt of the more highly educated will go unpunished. Henry Louis
Gates gives the following comparison:
(A)LeVon, if you find yourself struggling in your classes here, you should
realize it isn't your fault. It's simply that you're the beneficiary of a disruptive policy of affirmative action that places underqualified,
underprepared and often undertalented black students in demanding educa-

tional environments like this one. The policy's egalitarian aims may be
well-intentioned, but given the fact that aptitude tests place African Americans almost a full standard deviation below the mean, even controlling for
socioeconomic disparities, they are also profoundly misguided. The truth
is, you probably don't belong here, and your college experience will be a
long downhill slide.

(B) Out of my face, jungle bunny.
Lively and D'Souza make versions of the same argument.
In one respect, the classist argument is plainly wrong. Both blue-collar
and upper-class members of the campus community will be prohibited
from uttering racial slurs and epithets. Most hate-speech codes penalize
serious face-to-face insults based on race, ethnicity, and a few other
factors. They thus penalize the same harmful speech-for example,
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"N
_,
go home; you don't belong at this university"-whether
spoken by the billionaire's son or the coal miner's daughter. If the prep
school product is less likely to speak words of this kind, or to utter only
intellectualized versions like those in Gates' example, this may be because he is less racist in a raw sense. Many social scientists believe prejudice tends to be inversely correlated with educational level and social
position; the wealthy and well educated may well violate hate-speech
rules less often than others do. And, as for Gates' example, there is a
difference between his two illustrations, although not in the direction he
suggests. "Out of my face, jungle bunny" is a more serious case of hate
speech because (1) it is not open to argument or a more-speech response;
and (2) it bears overtones of a direct physical threat. The "LeVon" example, deplorable as it is, is answerable by more speech and contains no
element of threat.

7. Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right
A final neoconservative argument holds that hate speech may be wrong
but prohibition is not the way to deal with it. Gates, for example, warns
that two wrongs do not make a right and laments that our legal system
seems to have abandoned Henry Kalven's ideal of civil rights and civil
liberties as perfectly compatible goods for all. Lively writes that campaigns to limit speech end up backfiring against minorities because free
speech is a vital good and even more essential for minorities than others.
But we routinely deploy prohibitory rules in connection with dozens of
other kinds of speech we have decided we don't like, ranging from disrespectful speech to an authority figure, to shouting fire in a crowded
theatre and many others. Regulation always has costs. But it also has
benefits-symbolic as well as real. The same should be true of hatespeech rules. It's worth noting that the most common alternative conservatives tout-more speech-has costs, too. The black undergraduate
called a n
as he walks home from the library late at night by five
toughs-and who then talks back to his offenders-may end up severely
beaten. Talking back later, such as through a letter to the editor or a
campus forum, does not correct the actual offenders. Besides, as we
noted, why should minority or gay undergraduates or women, already
saddled with the demands of their own education, be charged with constantly going around educating others?
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Like the liberal arguments, none of the neoconservative ones stands as
an obstacle in the way of enacting hate-speech rules. A final group of
arguments concerns administrability and is not associated with any particular position. These objections all have to do with the effectuation of
hate-speech rules. How would they work? Would they work too
well-turn out to be boundless in their reach? Who would enforce the
rules, and what would prevent that person or body from becoming a
censor who seizes upon every caustic or off-color remark so that campus
discourse becomes cautious and lifeless? Each of these objections reveals
a degree of result-orientation, fear of the new, and distrust of those
(mainly people of color) who might take advantage of the rules.
8. Where Would We Draw the Line?
Take the drawing-the-line argument first. It is no doubt true that a rule
that penalizes on-campus hurling of face-to-face racial slurs would require some line drawing. What does on-campus mean? Is an epithet
hurled at three African-American students from twenty feet away "faceto-face"? Is water buffalo, or honkey, or dumb baboon, a racial slur?
These are indeed difficulties but they are no greater than those attending
other, long-accepted doctrines that limit speech we do not like, such as
libel, defamation, plagiarism, copyright, threat, and so on. Our system of
law has opted for a regime of simply stated rules, trading the benefit of
certainty in core cases in return for a degree of uncertainty at the periphery. Everyone knows what a clear-cut case of plagiarism looks like;
at the margin we are less sure. Hate-speech -rules should be no different.
9. Reverse Enforcement
The same is true with reverse enforcement. Some authorities may
indeed begin charging black students with hate speech directed against
whites. But the American experience with hate-speech rules shows that
this is not a major concern, nor is it in most Western countries with a
liberal tradition. If reverse enforcement occasionally happens, it is not
necessarily a bad thing-if in fact the black or Mexican has harassed or
terrorized a fellow student who is white or Asian. If the fear is that college deans and other administrative officers are so racist that they will
invent or magnify charges against minority students in order to punish or
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expel them from campus, this is entirely implausible. Figures from U.S.
News and World report show that college administrators and faculty
harbor less anti-black animus than the average American, even than the
average college student. Indeed, it is the very concern of campus administrators over dwindling black numbers that underlies enactment of most
hate-speech rules.
10. Chilling and Censoring
A final version of the administrability fear is that whoever is put in
charge of enforcing hate-speech rules will overdo it in the opposite direction-will grab power and begin extending the crusade into areas such as
classroom speech or editorials in the campus newspaper where speech
ought to be free. With properly drafted hate-speech rules this expansion
should not occur and appears not to be occurring. Like other Western
societies that have enacted hate-speech rules, campuses do not report a
lessening of respect for free speech and inquiry. Indeed, minorities and
political dissidents feel freer to speak, attend school, and otherwise participate in public life. The level of dialogue goes up not down.
There seems to be little good reason, either in constitutional law or in
social policy, not to enact rules against vicious face-to-face hate speech
that disparages members of the campus community based on unalterable
characteristics going to their deepest identity. Most campus administrators
favor these rules, realizing that they are an important part of preserving a
campus atmosphere of respect for all. The most common objections to
these rules are easily answered. Every one of the twenty or thirty exceptions to free speech now on the books is capable of being wielded heavyhandedly. That has not prevented us from maintaining and refining rules
such as libel, official secrets, assault, threat, plagiarism, copyright, and
many more-rules that we have collectively decided advance important
non-speech objectives such as privacy, dignity, property, or personal
security. The basic values of human decency and equal respect that underlie our civil rights heritage are surely more than sufficient basis for a
further limited exception. The right of the bigot to spew racial venom,
like your right to punch your fist into my nose, must yield in the face of
these other interests. Canada, Sweden, France, Italy, Germany, and many
other societies have come to the same conclusions. Anti-hate-speech rules
are desirable, necessary, and not at all inconsistent with a spirit of free
inquiry. Indeed, for the reasons we mentioned they may be necessary for
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its full effectuation and flowering. Thank you very much.

[Vol. 23:3

